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C3.7.1. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The Missile Technology Control Regime is an informal and voluntary international political arrangement designed to control the proliferation of rocket and unmanned air vehicle (UAV) systems and associated equipment and technology capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Although the regime is a political commitment rather than a treaty with international legal obligation, many countries, including the United States, have passed laws restricting the export of MTCR-controlled items. See Arms Export Control Act (AECA), Chapter 7.

C3.7.1.1. MTCR Screening Process. Regime controls are applicable to all items on the MTCR annex as listed in 22 CFR Part 121.16. The DoS, DoC, and DoD each has a role in regulating the export of MTCR-controlled items from the United States. DoD identifies MTCR-controlled items that purchasers have requested via FMS. To ensure technical reviews are standardized, reviewers must complete a DSCA-approved Missile Technology Proliferation Course. IAs maintain a roster of personnel trained and/or knowledgeable on MTCR controls to be updated and provided quarterly to DSCA (Programs Directorate).

C3.7.1.1.1. Upon receipt of an LOR, prior to LOA development, the System Program Office (SPO), Program Manager (PM), or equivalent will perform a technical review of each LOA to identify MTCR-controlled items contained in the LOA or envisioned to be part of the associated program. (Special reporting requirements apply to bulk compounds (Item 4) and fuses (Item 2.A.1.f.))*

*The reviewer must report the compounds listed in Item 4 of the MTCR Annex if they are to be exported in bulk or in any other manner or form that might support the creation of a propellant for a missile or a UAV. However, the reviewer is not to report Item 4 explosive compounds if they are molded or poured into a form that precludes their use as rocket propellant (e.g., as a bursting, propelling, or gas generating charge in a shell, cartridge, squib, or actuator). Even though all fuses meet the criteria of Item 2.A.1.f. in the MTCR Annex (i.e., “weapon or warhead safing, arming, fusing and firing mechanisms...”), the reviewer is not to report any common type munitions fuse as a possible MTCR controlled item unless the fuse in question is of an unusual type, a rough equivalent of which is not likely to be found in most foreign arsenals, or unless the fuse uses sophisticated means (e.g., radar) to determine burst height.

C3.7.1.1.2. The reviewer transmits a list of the MTCR-controlled items to the IA MTCR point of contact (POC) at the earliest opportunity to ensure minimal delays in the LOA processing time. This list includes: the case identifier; a general case description identifying major associated systems; the Military Articles and Services List (MASL) number of each MTCR-controlled item; the MTCR Annex Category and item identifier, the nomenclature of each item; and a detailed description of each item including the manufacturer.

C3.7.1.1.3. The IA MTCR POC verifies the list and forwards it via memorandum by email to DSCA (Programs Directorate, Weapons Division) at mtcr@dsca.mil. The memorandum should include the name, telephone and fax number, and e-mail address of the IA MTCR POC.

C3.7.1.1.4. DSCA (Programs Directorate, Weapons Division) reviews and forwards the memorandum to the DoS, Deputy Director, Office of Chemical, Biological, and Missile Threat Reduction, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN/MTR), for review and approval. DSCA will relay DoS’s reply to the IA and Case Writing Division.

C3.7.2. MTCR Category I ISR UAVs/UCAVs. Below list is not inclusive.

RQ-1/MQ-1 Predator MQ-9 Reaper RQ-4 Global Hawk Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Sky Warrior NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance (NATO AGS)

C3.7.2.1. USG policy stipulates a “strong presumption to deny” the transfer of MTCR Category I ISR UAVs/UCAVs. If the SCO becomes aware that the host country is considering submission of an LOR for an MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV prior to development and submission of an LOR for such a system, the SCO should initiate a requirements analysis and pre-screening. This process begins with a Security Cooperation Organization Assessment (SCOA) providing all elements of information in Table C3.T4. below. In the preparation of the SCOA, the SCO should consult and confer with the IAs, including the IA’s Foreign Disclosure Office; the Country Team; and the Combatant Command (CCMD). When complete, the SCOA will be forwarded to the CCMD for comment on each of elements 1-17 addressed in the SCOA in a subsequent CCMD Comment (CC). The SCOA and the CC should be forwarded to the Joint Staff/J5 and DSCA. This process forms the basis for a collaborative effort, to analyze the recipient nation’s military requirements in order to identify a platform/payload combination (manned aircraft, Cat II UAV/UCAV, or Cat I UAV/UCAV) that fulfills those requirements and complies with the MTCR and other USG security requirements. If the SCO is not able to develop the SCOA in advance of submission of an LOR for an MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV, SCOA required information should be submitted as part of the Country Team Assessment (CTA). See Table C5.T1b.

Table C3.T4. MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV
Security Cooperation Organization Assessment (SCOA)

#	Required Information
1	What are the military requirements and operational intentions or plans for the ISR UAV/UCAV that might be requested, to include: Description of the primary mission and secondary missions for the ISR UAV/UCAV? Extent of anti-terrorist, border patrol/ coast guard, and/or humanitarian missions for the UAV/UCAV(s) endorsed.
2	Specify performance characteristics of the desired air vehicle in terms of range (km), payload (kg), payload performance parameters or desired capabilities, altitude ceiling (ft), flight endurance (hrs). Are there any desired modifications or changes to the basic configuration for the desired air vehicle or payload?
3	How the ISR UAV or UCAV would affect the military capabilities of the proposed recipient, including the ability of the recipient effectively to field, support, and appropriately employ the system in accordance with its intended end-use.
4	How the ISR UAV or UCAV would contribute to U.S. strategic and foreign policy goals.
5	Justification for number and type of ISR UAV/UCAV that might be requested with an explanation of how the quantity endorsed is the minimum required consistent with the legitimate military requirements of the recipient. What is the estimated or approximate monthly number of sorties and flight hours? Where will the ISR UAV/UCAVs be based?
6	What are the communications resources that the recipient nation would utilize to support its ISR UAV/UCAV flight operations? Does the recipient nation require beyond line-of-sight flight operations? Will air-ground communications and/or data transfer require encryption?
7	If applicable, would the ISR UAV/UCAV fulfill or contribute to NATO force goals?
8	Explain why an MTCR Category I ISR UAV or UCAV would fulfill the requirements and a manned aircraft or non-MTCR Category 1 ISR UAV or UCAV cannot.
9	Is this the first introduction of this system/capability to the recipient/region?
10	Anticipated reactions of neighboring nations to the introduction of the ISR UAV/UCAV capability into the region.
11	Analysis of how the proposed sale would affect the relative military strengths of countries in the region and of the impact of the proposed sale on U.S. relations with the countries in the region.
12	Extent of military interoperability missions/training with U.S. Forces?
13	The availability of comparable systems from foreign suppliers.
14	Assessment of the nation’s ability to account for, safeguard, operate, maintain, and support the ISR UAV or UCAV. What is the nation’s maintenance concept? Two level? Three level? Does the nation expect it will provide depot level repair or will it elect contractor provided depot level maintenance? What level of repairable stocks does the nation anticipate it will require?
15	A plan for end-use monitoring for sensitive and advanced war fighting technology and the SCO’s plan for compliance verification.
16	Training required either in-country or in the United States and anticipated reactions resulting from the presence of U.S. trainers in-country. How many pilots, sensor operators, and maintainers will it need to be trained either in-country or in the United States? Approximately when, if elected, the nation needs to commence/end U.S.-based training? Will the nation need in-country flight simulators? If so, how many? Will the nation need to participate in related USAF/ISN UAV user-groups, forums, or other USAF/USN programs concurrent with adopting a U.S. UAV.
17	Possible impact of any in-country U.S. presence that might be required as a result of providing the ISR UAV or UCAV.
18	Is the potential recipient a: Member of NATO? MTCR Partner? Signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? Signatory to the Chemical Warfare Convention? Signatory to the Biological Weapons Convention?
19	Has the SCO consulted with the Foreign Disclosure Office of the FMS Implementing Agency regarding the need for disclosure of information actions in regard to a potential transfer of a Category I ISR UAV/UCAV? Yes/No
20	Any additional information in support of, or that would recommend against, the transfer request.

C3.7.3. Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR).

C3.7.3.1. C4ISR Definition. C4ISR encompasses systems, procedures, and techniques used to collect and disseminate information. It includes intelligence collection and dissemination networks, command and control networks, and systems that provide the common operational/ tactical picture. It also includes information assurance products and services, as well as communications standards that support the secure exchange of information by C4ISR systems. Under the C4ISR umbrella, systems exchange digital, voice, and video data to appropriate levels of command. The two key aspects of C4ISR systems are access to secure networks controlled by Information Security (INFOSEC) products and services, and the classified data resident in the C4ISR networks. See CJCSI 6510.06B (not for public release) for information on the release of U.S. INFOSEC products (Communications Security (COMSEC), cryptographic algorithms, cryptographic key material, security infrastructure) to foreign purchasers. Transfers of U.S. C4ISR capabilities to countries and international organizations must support a U.S. Combatant Commander’s (CCDR) interoperability requirements or otherwise clearly benefit U.S. objectives. A purchaser’s desire to be interoperable with the United States is insufficient justification for release. A purchaser must obtain approval from the supporting CCMD for access to classified U.S. C4ISR and INFOSEC prior to submitting a Letter of Request (LOR) for C4ISR. Pre-LOR coordination activities will take place between the requesting foreign purchaser (via SCO in country or Embassy in the United States) and DSCA (Programs Directorate). See Section C3.3.4. Prior to physically receiving any U.S. INFOSEC products or services associated with a secure C4ISR system, the purchaser must negotiate and sign a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) or other INFOSEC agreement (e.g., COMSEC MOU, INFOSEC Equipment Agreement) with the CCMD.

C3.7.3.1.1. C4ISR Responsibilities. Table C3.T5. lists organizations and their C4ISR responsibilities.

Table C3.T5. C4ISR Responsibilities

Organization	Responsibility
Security Cooperation Organization	Informs host country of the requirement for NATO or CCMD sponsorship of requests for INFOSEC-enabled C4ISR systems Coordinates pre-LOR C4ISR requirements with CCMD and DSCA (Programs Directorate through Operations Directorate) Forwards LOR after pre-coordination to Implementing Agency
Purchaser	Signs bilateral CISMOA or other binding INFOSEC agreement Coordinates with SCO on pre-LOR C4ISR requirements Submits LOR for a dedicated INFOSEC facility and staffing by two U.S. accredited COMSEC custodians to Implementing Agency. See Section C3.7.3.2.6.
U.S. Combatant Commander	Establishes interoperability requirement for specific C4ISR capabilities requiring INFOSEC products and services Initiates CJCSI 6510.06 INFOSEC release process Following delegation from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, negotiates and signs the CISMOA or other appropriate bilateral INFOSEC agreement governing the transfer of INFOSEC products and services to non-NATO nations, excluding Australia and New Zealand
DSCA	DSCA (Operations and Programs Directorates) reviews C4ISR pre-LOR requirements in coordination with NSA and CCMD, and, as appropriate, assigns the lead Implementing Agency Monitors planning activities
Implementing Agencies	Receive and review C4ISR LORs after pre-LOR review by DSCA Obtain DSCA (Operations Directorate) approval before processing LOR Generate Price and Availability (P&A) data and/or FMS case
National Security Agency (NSA)	Identifies the appropriate INFOSEC solution to satisfy CCMD validated interoperability requirements Delegates authority through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the CCMD to negotiate the COMSEC portion of the CISMOA, or to negotiate INFOSEC Equipment Agreements Generates FMS case for foreign purchase of U.S. INFOSEC products and services; under limited circumstances, provides written authority to MILDEPs to include specific INFOSEC products and services on Military Department FMS cases. See National COMSEC Instruction (NACSI) 6001 (not public).
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	Validates CCMD interoperability requirements associated with the requests for U.S. INFOSEC products and services Delegates final authority to CCMD to negotiate and conclude the CISMOA

C3.7.3.2. C4ISR Release Process.

C3.7.3.2.1. Release of Classified Military Data. Interoperable systems that exchange classified military information are subject to a releasability review and approval as defined in NDP-1. In addition to classified system hardware and software information, all data flowing between foreign and secure U.S. C4ISR systems are classified. Approvals for release of U.S. classified data flowing over secure coalition networks are required before issuance of LOA and/or P&A data. See Section C3.6.

C3.7.3.2.2. INFOSEC Release. The release process for INFOSEC products is defined in CJCSI 6510.06B. INFOSEC releases to non-NATO nations (excluding Australia and New Zealand) are limited to specific quantities in support of a specific interoperability requirement with the exception of GPS/PPS and IFF Mode 4 releases, which are not limited to a specific quantity or platform. Once GPS/PPS and IFF Mode 4 devices are approved for release, the purchaser may obtain them through National Security Agency-authorized channels.

C3.7.3.2.3. INFOSEC LOAs. The Director, National Security Agency, (DIRNSA) is the National Manager for INFOSEC products to include both external COMSEC equipment and embedded cryptographic modules. The IA for COMSEC and embedded cryptographic modules is determined by the Acquisition Manager of a particular device. DIRNSA may allow some NSA-managed INFOSEC materiel to be included on other IA managed LOAs due to urgent operational requirements, end of fiscal year funding issues, etc. Requests for exceptions to allow NSA-managed INFOSEC materiel on other IA LOAs will not be granted due to the lack of an existing NSA LOA or to avoid the Small Case Management Line. Special Purpose INFOSEC equipment (“S” Type COMSEC) will be provided to Non-NATO Nations on NSA-managed FMS cases only. Requests to allow “S” Type COMSEC equipment on other IA LOAs will not be granted.

C3.7.3.2.4. INFOSEC Validation/Authorization. All IAs, even those responsible for the acquisition of the INFOSEC equipment and embedded cryptographic modules, must request DIRNSA determination as to whether INFOSEC equipment and embedded cryptographic modules are releasable and whether they can be included on an LOA written by an IA other than NSA. Requests must include a copy of the purchaser’s LOR, nomenclature of the INFOSEC and/or embedded cryptographic modules, quantities, and identify the weapon system or platform in which the INFOSEC equipment will be integrated. DIRNSA will provide a written response to the IA within 30 days of the request. Some responses may include special instructions for INFOSEC materiel that requires special handling.

C3.7.3.2.5. Classification of INFOSEC. The association of a specific INFOSEC product with a foreign government may be classified; however, classifying the entire FMS case will be avoided, when possible. See Section C5.4.10. for more information on classified FMS cases.

C3.7.3.2.6. INFOSEC Accounts, Facilities, and Custodians. C4ISR purchasers may be required to establish a dedicated INFOSEC account and purchase an INFOSEC facility manned by two U.S.-accredited INFOSEC custodians. The CCMD determines whether an INFOSEC account is required during the negotiation phase of the CISMOA with the purchaser. NSA and the CCMD may assign additional duties to INFOSEC custodians.

C3.7.4. Electronic Warfare (EW) Systems and EW Integrated Reprogramming Database (EWIRDB).

C3.7.4.1. Definition. EW Systems (e.g., radar warning receivers and jammers) are designed to deny or counteract the enemy's use of electromagnetic (EM) emitters (e.g., radar, communications, guidance, detection, and control devices). The sale of an EW capability involves the transfer of the EW system hardware, firmware, and software. The software typically includes a mission data file (MDF) or library that contains information/data related to EM emitters. The EWIRDB is the primary DoD source for technical parametric performance data on EM emitters and is used to program/reprogram the MDF to correctly identify emitters by their EM characteristics. Prior to offering an LOA to the FMS customer that includes an EW system, the FMS IA must review all EW system components to verify that the system, to include the MDF, has been approved for release and certified in writing by the appropriate DoD authorities (i.e. National Security Agency (NSA), National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and applicable program offices). If an EW system is not certified in writing prior to sale, the FMS purchaser must be advised and the FMS IA must ensure a plan is in place to obtain data protection certification from the NSA prior to delivery. Delivery cannot take place without this certification unless the FMS customer uses its own technical parametric performance data instead of DoD data.

C3.7.4.2. FMS EWIRDB Types. The FMS EWIRDB is used to create the MDF or library for EW systems. There are two types of FMS EWIRDB, Direct and Indirect. A Direct FMS EWIRDB is delivered directly to the FMS customer and provides data required for an In-Country Reprogramming (ICR) capability for the EW system. An Indirect FMS EWIRDB is delivered to the U.S. reprogramming facility that will develop the MDF for the requesting country’s EW system. Both Direct and Indirect EWIRDBs must go through the release processes described below prior to the FMS sale.

C3.7.4.3. EW Release Process. An LOR advisory should be issued to NSA and the applicable MILDEPs by DSCA (Operations Directorate) when an LOR is received for an EW system that will be used on a country’s weapon system for the first time. This advisory will notify the EW community of the pending request so that the evaluation process can begin. It is critical that the evaluation process be initiated as soon as possible due to the amount of time required to complete the process. Table C3.T6. lists organizations and their EW responsibilities.

Table C3.T6. EW Responsibilities

Organization	Responsibility
DSCA	Prepares LOR Advisory for potential sale of EW system Reviews LOA prior to offer to ensure appropriate reviews have been accomplished
Implementing Agencies	Provides copy of LOR to DSCA with details on what EW system will be proposed for potential platform sale, to be used for LOR advisory Determine if proposed EW system has been certified by NSA for handling of classified data Incorporate required EW costs and program schedule impacts into LOA; advise purchaser of certification status and potential schedule risks and impacts Reviews LOA and verifies appropriate reviews have been accomplished prior to being offered to customer
Implementing Agency EW Points of Contact Air Force (Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs Regional Weapons Division) (SAF/IARW) Army (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation) (SAAL-NI) Navy (Navy International Programs Office Strategic Planning Directorate) (Navy IPO-03)	Process any required disclosure requests for applicable classified military information Work with program office and vendor to develop technical documentation required for evaluation of EW systems data protection Evaluate requirement to determine if Release in Principle (RIP) has been granted for a particular system. If not, submit request for RIP to DIA, NSA and SIGCOM for approval/authorization Upon LOA signature work with purchaser as applicable to identify data base requirements and submit request for Release in Specific (RIS) to DIA, NSA and SIGCOM for approval/authorization Validate that LOA is written appropriately to incorporate specific EW verbiage.
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)	Review and process Service requests for EW system RIP and RIS
National Security Agency (NSA)	Review and process Service requests for EW system RIP and RIS Review and provide guidance for data protection certification for EW systems
National SIGINT Committee (SIGCOM)	Review and process Service requests for EW system RIP and RIS
Purchaser	Upon LOA signature participate in dialog with IA FMS offices to identify required data to be included in EW data base

C3.7.4.3.1. Release of Classified Military Information. EW systems that use classified military information are subject to a releasability review and approval as defined in the NDP-1. In addition to possible classified system hardware and software, the system MDF may include classified data. Approvals for release of U.S. classified data are required before an LOA can be offered to a purchaser.

C3.7.4.3.2. FMS EWIRDB Release in Principle. Prior to offering an LOA for FMS EWIRDB support, there must be an approved and valid Release in Principle (RIP) in place for the use of the Direct or Indirect FMS EWIRDB. The FMS EWIRDB RIP is issued by NSA for a particular country on a specific weapon system platform, and is not related to a COMSEC RIP. Once the IA Program Office or vendor determines there is an FMS EWIRDB requirement, a request for a RIP should be submitted to the appropriate IA EW point of contact listed in Table C3.T4. The IA will designate a point of contact for receipt of these requirements to ensure consistency in the submissions to the DoD authorities. The request for a RIP will be submitted to the DoD disclosure authorities (Table C3.T4.). At a minimum, these requests will identify the requesting country, platform, type of database (Direct/Indirect) and EW system nomenclature, if known. Once the RIP is granted, an LOA for FMS EWIRDB support can be offered to the purchaser. The IA should enter comments in Defense Security Assistance Management System (DSAMS) case remarks stating that an EW RIP has been granted, citing the approving agency, date of grant, and point of contact.

C3.7.4.4. FMS EWIRDB Release in Specific. Upon acceptance by the customer of an LOA for an EW system with FMS EWIRDB support, the IA EW point of contact will coordinate with the country to determine the desired data to be incorporated into the FMS EWIRDB. This information, along with the identified recipient country, platform, type of database (Direct/Indirect) and EW system will be used by the EW points of contact at the applicable IA to develop a request for a Release in Specific (RIS). The RIS will be submitted to the DoD disclosure authorities for approval. If approved, the RIS will authorize the EWIRDB executive agent, NASIC, to begin the development of an FMS EWIRDB for a particular country, platform, and EW system as funded by an FMS LOA. Table C3.T4. lists organizations and their EW responsibilities.

C3.7.4.5. LOA Requirements. All LOAs that offer EW systems and/or data base support must clearly identify, in the LOA notes, the nomenclature of the EW system components, the type of data base support being provided and the platforms associated with the EW system and/or data base support. The LOA notes must clearly state if an EW system is not certified prior to the LOA being offered.

C3.7.4.6. Identification, Friend or Foe (IFF) Systems. IFF systems are sensitive identification devices that emit signals used to identify whether a platform is friend or foe and thereby prevent fratricide. See DSCA Policy Memo 11-40.

C3.7.4.7. IFF Release Requirements. Release of IFF Mode 4 capability to foreign governments must be handled according to the COMSEC release process of CJCSI 6510.06B, Communications Releases to Foreign Nations, March 31, 2011 as described in C3.7.3.1. IFF Mode 4 is typically approved on a general release basis, which means it is not tied to a specific quantity or platform. Transfers of dual IFF Mode 4/5 (Mark XIIA) systems are based on validated interoperability requirements. Any dual IFF Mode 4/5 systems sold will initially, provide IFF mode 4 operational capability only. Table C3.T7. lists organizations and their release coordination responsibilities.

Table C3.T7. IFF Release Coordination Responsibilities

Organization	Responsibility
DSCA	Review LOA prior to offering, to ensure appropriate reviews have been accomplished and approvals are in place.
Implementing Agencies	Prior to offering an LOA for IFF Mode 4 or 5, request approval from NSA to sell associated COMSEC equipment. Upon identification of appropriate IFF system for platform, ensure DoD AIMS PO has certified the IFF system prior to delivery.
National Security Agency (NSA)	Review and process COMSEC release requests in accordance with applicable release processes. Provide "approval to sell" letters to Implementing Agencies (IA) for IFF COMSEC devices. Provide IFF Mode 5 test key, as required.
DoD AIMS PO	Evaluate systems to determine whether they comply with relevant standards; certify those that do.
Purchaser	Nations National Distribution Authority (NDA) or COMSEC custodians should request COMSEC keying materiel from the controlling authority, i.e., Joint COMSEC Management Office (JCMO), McDill Air Force Base, FL.

C3.7.4.7.1. IFF systems that use classified military information are subject to a disclosure review and approval as defined in the NDP-1. Per NDP-1, approvals for release of U.S. classified data are mandatory before an LOA can be offered to a purchaser.

C3.7.4.7.2. IFF Mode 4 Keying Materiel is obtained by COMSEC Accounts from the Controlling Authority. The Controlling Authority for the IFF Mode 4 is the Joint COMSEC Management Office (JCMO). Until IFF Mode 5 is in operational use, only the Mode 5 test key will be available. An IFF Mode 5 test key must be obtained through the National Security Agency. The procedure for release of IFF Mode 5 operational key will be determined once IFF Mode 5 is in operational use by U.S. forces.

C3.7.4.7.3. The DoD AIMS PO is responsible for ensuring Mark XIIA systems meet the interoperability requirements described in the DoD AIMS 03-1000 series standards. Prior to transfer of IFF Mode 5 or dual Mode 4/5 systems, the IA must ensure the system has been certified for interoperability by the AIMS PO.

C3.7.4.7.4. All LOAs for the provision of IFF Mode 4 or 5 systems must clearly identify the IFF system components in an LOA note. The LOA notes should also clearly state whether or not an IFF system has been certified as meeting AIMS standards, to ensure the FMS customer is aware of the certification status.

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