Draft Remarks for Deputy Secretary Rudy de Leon
2nd Annual Security Cooperation Conference 
Hilton Hotel
Crystal City, Virginia 
11 July 2000
[Current: 2,790 words; 19 minutes]


Event: Starting at 9:00 A.M. (second day of 3-day conference), you are scheduled to address for 15-20 minutes approx. 350 USG (75%) and foreign government (5%) security assistance professionals, industry representatives (20%) and Congressional staff. DSCA Director LTG Davison will deliver his speech the previous day and will return to introduce you. Approx. 15 minutes Q&A scheduled to follow. Main points: [1] Importance of security assistance to maintaining global peace, stability; [2] Importance of FMS in security assistance arena, need for continued reform; [3] Guiding principles for ongoing FMS reform; [4] Need for greater transatlantic defense cooperation (Berlin speech redux); [5] Export control initiative (Berlin speech redux).


General Davison, thank you -
For your kind words; and,
For your leadership in confronting the challenges that bring us here today.
As all of you know, next month, the General will leave this position and his beloved Army after more than three decades of service.
As some of you know, the General hails from a long line of distinguished Davisons in the Army -
A legacy recognized in Davison Airfield at Fort Belvoir.
General Davison, like your father and grandfather before you, you too have served this nation with honor --
Whether as a young platoon leader in Vietnam;
As a Cold War commander in Europe; or,
As a builder of bridges with other nations in your current capacity.
So on behalf of the Department -
Indeed, on behalf of the nation and those nations represented here today who have benefited from your leadership -
Thank you for your lifetime of service. 
[Lead applause]

General Walters - to whom we look to carry on the great work General Davison has started;
Deputy Director Robert Keltz - without whom so much of the progress of recent years would have been impossible;
Representatives from our industry partners;
Representatives from our allies and friends;
Ladies and gentlemen;

[Before I begin, I want to take a moment to address an issue that has dominated the news in recent days.
HOLD FOR POSSIBLE NMD/7 JULY TEST UPDATE; DEPSEC TO DECIDE AT PODIUM.]

I thought I might begin this morning by sharing an event that for me recently went from being a piece of history to being quite personal.
As you know, two weeks ago the United States and our South Korean allies marked the 50th anniversary of the start of the Korean War.
And in between the ceremonies and the pomp and circumstance, I had a remarkable meeting with some remarkable men -
Members of the legendary Task Force Smith, the first U.S. forces to see battle in that war;
Including their leader, Lieutenant Colonel Charles "Brad" Smith himself.
And over lunch they shared stories with each other and with us that they hadn't even shared with their own families for fifty years.

They spoke of how Task Force Smith had deployed early to Korea with high morale, but with low combat readiness. 
They told of facing overwhelming enemy forces outside Osan, South Korea - fewer than 600 Americans with mortars versus some 6,000 North Koreans with dozens of tanks.
They spoke of lacking the right equipment - their radios were rusted and broke down every time their jeeps hit a hole in the road.
They described how they lacked the right weapons - their bazooka shells literally bounced off the oncoming North Korean tanks.
And after only the first day, there was little left of Task Force Smith -- one out of every four soldiers was a casualty, and those that remained limped through a fighting retreat.
All this, just five years after American and Allied forces triumphed in World War II.

Make no mistake -
Those who fought at Osan were heroes who served with distinction.
The men of Task Force Smith did not fail America.
American failed Task Force Smith. 
After World War II we had embarked on a dramatic military drawdown that dismantled many of our forces - and those of our allies -- without protecting readiness.
The men of Task Force Smith - and those of our allies -- paid for that failure with their bodies and their blood.

I mention Task Force Smith because it holds lessons for us today:
That now, just as then, seemingly distant dangers can suddenly come upon us;
That now, just as then, failure to invest in our warriors and their weapons - and those of our allies - is to invite great risk to the safety of our forces and the security of our nation; and,
That now, just as then, we need strong partnerships with other nations backed by strong forces to preserve peace and deter - and if necessary defeat - aggression.

In recent years, those enduring lessons of Task Force Smith have on many occasions been drowned out -- 
By those who question America's engagement, alliances and partnerships abroad; and,
By those who question the continued need for the myriad of programs that undergird our engagement abroad -
Programs such as Foreign Military Sales.

Questions about FMS, as everyone here knows, reached a critical mass a few years ago.
And I know that in his remarks yesterday General Davison cited some of the reasons.
Indeed, we need only recall the headlines from that time to remember how severe the critiques had become. 
Said one defense publication:
FMS is "too cumbersome, inefficient and driven by outdated security regulations." 
Wrote another:
"A group of countries want to abandon FMS." 
There was this dark prediction:
The program "could die." 
And then there was this critique:
FMS retains "very much a Cold War restrictive mindset;" it is "cumbersome, time consuming and heavily rule bound." 
And I would point out that that last quote was from none other than my predecessor - 
Dr. Hamre, who then spurred the effort to address these very concerns.

I think everyone in this room would agree that we have since witnessed the beginning of new era for FMS:
In General Davison's effort to reach out to customers, both in foreign governments and across the U.S. government;
In the reduction of the surcharge on sales, which underscores the commitment to make the entire FMS process more efficient; 
In moving toward giving foreign purchasers more visibility into the contract and production processes; and,
In conferences such as this, which send a powerful message that we need government and industry to work as partners in this process; 


Today, a review of recent headlines reveals a markedly improved picture.
I know General Davison mentioned these figures yesterday, but they bear worth repeating:
Some $12 billion in Foreign Military Sales last year;
Some $13 billion - or more - expected this year.
All of which reflect renewed confidence by other nations that these sales are still preferred for the total package of support, assistance, maintenance and training that only FMS can offer.
In short, the state of our Foreign Military Sales program is strong.
It is working well for America and our interests.
It is working well for our allies and their interests.
* * * *
Still, gatherings such as this wouldn't be necessary if there was no room for further improvement. 
Now, I know that I come to you half way through your discussions. 
So I thought I would use the remainder of my time to suggest some principles than can guide us as we explore what else we can do to sustain and strengthen this important program.

First and foremost, there should be no doubt about the importance of security cooperation programs like FMS.
Consider Europe.
Security cooperation from the U.S. is helping our new allies Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to upgrade and to integrate their militaries into NATO.
For example, there is the recent transfer of the former frigate USS Clark to Poland in a remarkable 8 months from the initial offer to commissioning in Poland a few weeks ago.
And just last month, Portugal joined the so-called "F-16 Group" to allow for even more transatlantic cooperation in upgrading those fighters under a program administered by FMS.

Consider Asia.
Security cooperation with the Republic of Korea has helped keep the peace of the peninsula in the half century since Task Force Smith;
There is Singapore, where the recent sale of Apache Longbow helicopters is an example of deepening U.S.-Singapore security cooperation. 

Or consider the Middle East, where so much of the peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors - especially Jordan and Egypt - is grounded in the capabilities and confidence that our security cooperation has provided.
Likewise, the recent and long waited sale of F-16s to the United Arab Emirates - a commercial sale supported by the Air Force through FMS -- will further strengthen that coalition partner. 

We encourage such sales and cooperation because they directly support our ability to protect our forces, ensure readiness, shape the world and secure our interests. 
And so I think any effort to "reinvent" FMS ought to also recognize that it will be just as important to our national security in the future and it has been in the past. 

Closely related to this is a second guiding principle:
A commitment to change.
I know that there have been some who have questioned whether this Department is truly committed over the long-run to reforming FMS.
Secretary Cohen and Dr. Hamre rightly recognized the need for real and lasting reform.
General Davison recognized this and does General Walters.

This effort cannot - and will not - be a one-time flash of activity like some comet in the sky, fantastic but fleeting.
Although it will indeed require leaders of vision, it is greater than any one leader. 
And so I wanted to come here today to convey my personal commitment to this cause. 
And I would add something else:
We have to do more than change mission statements and methods of business.
We have to change mindsets as well.
Mark Twain once remarked that "nothing needs reforming as much as other people's habits."
If this reform effort is going to result in real and lasting change, we need individuals - from senior leaders all the way down to the working level -- ready and willing to reform their own habits.
That's why when Dr. Hamre announced the reinvention of FMS two years ago he purposely did so as part of the larger Defense Reform Initiative and our ongoing Revolution in Business Affairs.
And so again, I wanted to come here today to underscore my personal commitment to working with and supporting you in this effort, and to stress the need for a personal commitment to change by everyone involved. 

This brings me to the third guiding principle I want to suggest this morning:
The need to remember the customer.
I know that one of the greatest accomplishments of the reinvention effort so far has been to "rediscover" the customer.
We need only look at the example of Finland's F-18 purchase. 
The 1992 FMS purchase of 64 aircraft was that nation's largest peacetime procurement in history.
It was the largest international Hornet collaboration in history. 
Thanks to cooperative and creative partnerships between both governments and the industry partners involved, the final aircraft will be rolled out in Finland next month -
Ahead of schedule;
Within budget; and,
With the Chief of Finnish Defense Forces declaring:
That FMS "fulfilled all of our expectations." 

I cannot overstate the value of these kinds of partnerships and this kind of cooperation, especially in the case of the NATO Alliance. 
Coalitions are only as strong as their weakest links, and it is no exaggeration to say that the NATO alliance cannot fight together -
If we do not first build together.
Coalition operations will require coalition business. 

An America more open to European business -- 
And a Europe more open to American business -
Means both more competition and industrial cooperation -- 
Which means more innovation -
Which means more capable and interoperable systems for our men and women in uniform. 

As I said last month in Berlin to an audience of military, civilian and business leaders from across the alliance -
The United States realizes that some of our own policies have been among the greatest barriers to greater industrial cooperation. 
For several years now, many in the United States have been concerned about an emergence of a "Fortress Europe" not open to U.S. companies . . .
Only to realize that American export controls in some cases support a "Fortress America" mentality. 
The United States has long pressed our NATO allies to improve their defense capabilities, most recently through the Defense Capabilities Initiative . . .
Only to find that our export control system has in some cases contributed to discouraging and making that difficult.
For example, during the air war over Kosovo it took more than two months to approve the sale of flares to the Italian coast guard for use in the potential rescue of downed Allied pilots, including Americans. 

That is why two months ago we unveiled the first major reform to our export control system since the Cold War.
I know that our Defense Trade Security Initiative was a topic of one of the working groups yesterday morning, but allow me to touch of some of the major themes and objectives.

Of our 17 specific reforms, our most significant proposal is to no longer require licenses for trade of unclassified defense items with certain allies. 
As we have for Canada, we are proposing to negotiate International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) exemptions from selected export rules.
As with Canada, we will have to negotiate with each country to ensure that their export controls and technology security practices - and those of companies in those countries -- are as effective as those of the United States.
By removing a number of licensing requirements, we hope to share more technology with - and from -- our allies . . .
While at the same time strengthening our collective protection of such technology through more effective export control systems.

This year's U.S.-U.K Declaration of Principles is a roadmap for this kind of industrial cooperation.
[Secretary Cohen expects to sign a similar document with Australia during his visit there later this week.]
As a next step, we look forward to beginning negotiations with both nations on an agreement allowing an exemption from ITAR.
In so doing, we also hope to create a strong incentive for other countries to strengthen their export control systems so we can enter into similar arrangements and share similar benefits. 

Our initiative will also remove a whole host of barriers and irritants currently impeding trans-Atlantic industrial cooperation.
This includes removing barriers between governments, thereby encouraging research and development.
We also are creating several types of umbrella licenses that will enable entire projects - projects that in the past have required dozens of separate licenses - to be covered under single licenses that would be valid for extended periods.

Our initiative also includes specific reforms to expedite procurements related to NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative. 
For example, DoD review processes will be shortened from 25 days down to 10 days for items specifically identified as supporting the DCI. 
And here I would note the obvious implications for FMS.

A final area of our initiative falls under what we could call "good government" - reforms designed to improve how this new system will work day-to-day. 
Atop the streamlining at DoD that has already reduced the amount of time it takes us to complete reviews -
We will increase our licensing staff by 50 percent.
We will also devote more resources and we will computerize our processes.
This includes some $30 million over three years for a new common computer system to expedite the review process.

As I have said on other occasions, these changes to our export control regime are designed to - and I believe will -- achieve three fundamental goals.
They are going to improve the ability of industry on both sides of the Atlantic to share technology and to learn from each other. 
At the same time, they are going to improve the security of these same technologies. 
And perhaps most importantly, they are going to improve the ability of NATO forces to operate together in the battles of the future -
Battles that will be won by militaries that harness the technologies and tools only industry can provide.

Which brings me to the fourth and final guiding principle I want to leave with you this morning:
Remember the warfighters.
It can sometimes be all too easy - in discussions and debates about sales and purchases, and budgets and balance sheets -- to loose sight of the people behind the programs.
But everything we do in the area of security cooperation -
Whether providing humanitarian training to other nations; or
Enabling nations to modernize and upgrade their forces --
Ultimately comes back to American men and women in uniform.
Cooperation that builds bridges with other militaries allows us to shape world events so that it is less likely our forces will have to fight.
Ensuring modern, interoperable forces among our allies and friends make it more likely our forces will succeed in the coalition operations of the future if they do have to fight. 

So in closing, let me take you back to where I started -
Half a century ago in Korea.
Among the men who fought that day outside Osan, and who joined us for that remarkable gathering of Task Force Smith was a man by the name of Tony Apodaca.
His is an incredible story.
Then-Private Apodaca found himself facing an advancing Soviet tank, single handedly firing a machine gun. 
Wounded in the back by enemy gunfire, he then crawled through the mud of the Han River, floating across to American troops who took him to the relative safety of a first aid station.
Lying on a hospital cot, the young private looked up into the hills behind the first aid station only to see hundreds of North Korean soldiers streaming towards him. 
As the medical station frantically evacuated, he found himself propped up in the back of a jeep with a gun; firing on the pursuing troops.

Unlike many of his fellow soldiers, Tony Apodaca made it out that day, only to return just a few months later after his recovery to land at Inchon with the Marines. 
He knows better than most the truth in the saying that is inscribed on the Korean Memorial that "Freedom is not free."

Our men and women serving in uniform today know this as well. 
They are prepared to make the same sacrifices as the Apodacas of earlier wars.
They only ask that we not make the same mistakes of 50 years ago.
They only ask that we prepare them and their future coalition partners with the tools and technologies to accomplish the missions we assign them.
That is the challenge that brings us to this conference.
That is why it is so important that this reinvention effort succeeds.
That is why I wanted to come here today.

Thank you very much.
I look forward to taking your questions.